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ABSTRACT
WHO RALLIES AROUND THE FLAG? ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF
FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS ON NATIONS’ POLITICAL STANCE USING
SOCIAL MEDIA DATA
VAHID GHAFOURI
Business Analytics M.Sc. Thesis, June 2020
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Nihat Kasap
Thesis Co-advisor: Assist. Prof. Babak RezaeeDaryakenari
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There is a common-sense that in times of foreign interventions, the country’s political
actors are likely to set aside their differences and support the state or the government
for a period of time as a temporary reaction to that foreign intervention. This
study focuses on the specific case of Iran-U.S. conflicts to investigate the effects of
events such as U.S. sanctions and military interventions on political discourse among
Iranian influencers on Twitter. The quantitative approach in this study utilizes
Classical Natural Language Processing to measure Iranian tweeps’ sentiment towards
the state across the time. We have grouped Iranian Twitter Influencers by their
political affiliations to analyze which political affiliations in Iran (e.g. Conservatives,
Reformists, . . . ) are more likely to rally around the flag in correspondence to foreign
interventions and what categories of foreign interventions have more potential in
stimulating them for such reactions.
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ÖZET
BAYRAK ETRAFINDA KIMLER TOPLANIR? MILLETLERIN SIYASI
TUTUMLARI ÜZERINDEKI DIŞ MÜDAHALELERIN ETKILERINI SOSYAL
MEDYA VERILERIYLE ANALIZ ETMEK
VAHID GHAFOURI
İş Analitiği Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Haziran 2020
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Nihat Kasap
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Babak RezaeeDaryakenari
Anahtar Sözcükler: dış müdahale, İran, ABD, doğal dil işleme, Twitter
Dış müdahaleler sırasında ülkenin siyasi aktörlerinin, farklılıklarını bir kenara bırak-
ması ve bu dış müdahaleye geçici bir tepki olarak bir süre devleti veya hükümeti
desteklemesi, aklı selime uygun bir harekettir. Bu çalışma, ABD yaptırımları ve
askeri müdahaleleri gibi olayların, İranlı etkileyicilerin Twitter’daki politik söylem-
leri üzerindeki etkilerini araştırmak için, İran-ABD uyuşmazlığının özel durumuna
odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışmadaki nicel yaklaşım, İranlı twitter arkadaşlarının, za-
man içinde devlete karşı duyarlılığını ölçmek için Klasik Doğal Dil İşleme kullan-
maktadır. İran’daki hangi siyasi bağlantıların (örneğin Muhafazakarlar, Reformcu-
lar, ...) dış müdahalelere karşı bayrak etrafında toplanma olasılığının olduğunu ve
hangi çeşit dış müdahalelerin bu tür reaksiyonu uyarmada daha fazla potansiyelinin
olduğunu analiz etmek için, İranlı Twitter etkileyicilerini politik bağlantılarına göre
grupladık.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On May 08, 2018, the U.S. president, Donald Trump, declared its withdrawal from
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Nuclear Agreement
between Iran and P5+1, calling it “rotten and decaying” raisin concerns about
not only the sanctions’ impact on the Iranian people and global market but also the
possibility of a tension outbreak in the classical tense relationships between U.S. and
Iran. One year later, on April 08, 2019, the White House designated Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) which
makes it the first time Washington has officially used this term for a foreign country’s
military. Meanwhile, the use of hostile language among US-Iran’s officials on social
media mounted to its peak when Trump threatened the “End of Iran” as a response
to a missile attack on the US embassy in Baghdad which Iranian-backed forces were
accused of. Later on, events such as the Iranian shoot-down of a U.S. drone and
the UK’s seizure of Iranian-flagged ship in Gibraltar fueled the tensions in a limited
scope. Furthermore, when the U.S. imposed sanctions on MohammadJavad Zarif,
Iranian foreign minister, it occurred to many as if the gates of diplomacy between
the two countries is going to be totally closed for a while.
US-Iran tensions raised to its peak, and evolved into a direct conflict after U.S.
military forces allegedly assassinated Gen. Qasem Soleimani, the commander of
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and one of Iran’s
most important military commanders, in an airstrike in Baghdad on January 2,
2020.
Although Iran had been facing intense economic protests just a few months prior
to the U.S. strike, a surprisingly vast number of people in Iran and Iraq came to
the streets mourning the death of Qassem Soleimani and Abu-Mahdi Al-Muhandis.
Many of the conventional opposition figures (e.g. foreign minister of the previous
regime, Ardashir Zahedi; the former executive editor of VOA-PNN, Mohammad
Manzarpour) condemned the attack supporting the Iranian state’s position. This
has risen an interesting case-study of the phenomenon called ‘Rally Round the Flag’.
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There is abundant literature focusing on the impact of foreign interventions on
democracy and human rights. For instance, Peksen (2011) argues that the chances
of extra-judicial killing, disappearance, political imprisonment, and torture increase
under supportive and neutral interventions, and hostile interventions merely in-
creases the probability of political imprisonment. However, due to the recent events
happening in Iran, we found our interest in analyzing the impact of foreign inter-
vention on a country’s internal political discourse and public sentiment towards the
state.
More specifically, we are curious to see that in reaction to what types of foreign
intervention cases, what certain political affiliations and camps are likely to set
aside their differences and support the state or the government for at least a period
of time.
Our work is a Social-Media-Analysis which mainly focuses on observing the ’Rally
Round the Flag’ phenomenon on Twitter by looking into the variations in behaviour
of the accounts of Iranian Influencers. Despite some of the previous who focus the
network analysis of tweeps, we use a content-based approach that looks into the
sentiments of the tweets generated by the tweeps and tries to measure its variations
across the time. Using a semi-supervised NLP algorithm, we show that the average
of positive sentiments among Persian Twitter influencers, increases in three out of
seven cases of foreign conflict, which we interpret as empirical proofs for ’rally round
the flag’ effect in our case-study. Moreover, we detect the effect in tweeps from each
political affiliation separately to provide further intuition on the groups who are
more prone to the phenomenon.
2
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we will initially review the previous literature on the concept of
’rally round the flag’ effect. Then we will look into the methods used for ideology
measuring in social-media and the reason we decided to use a content-based approach
rather than the more prevalent network-based methods.
2.1 The Concept of ’Rally Round the Flag’
The ‘Rally Round the Flag’ is a term suggested by John Muller for discussing the
temporary effect of popular support for the President of the United States during
periods of international crisis or war (Goldstein, Pevehouse & Sernau, 2008). It is a
common belief that in times of major national conflicts American people are likely to
set aside their disagreements with the incumbent presidents’ policies or performance
in the office to demonstrate a united front to the international community (Baker
& Oneal, 2001).
Mueller (1970) proposed that the ‘Rally Round the Flag’ effect would be emerging
as a response to an event with three qualities:
1. "Is international"
2. "Involves the United States and particularly the President directly"
3. "Specific, dramatic, and sharply focused"
In addition, Mueller split the rallies into five categories:
1. "Sudden US military intervention" (e.g., Korean War, Bay of Pigs Invasion)"
2. "Major diplomatic actions" (e.g., Truman Doctrine)
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3. "Dramatic technological developments" (e.g., Sputnik)
4. "US-Soviet summit meetings" (e.g., Potsdam Conference)
5. "Major military developments in ongoing wars" (e.g., Tet Offensive)
Although Mueller’s three-part definition of the rally effect has been widely accepted
by other scholars, his five-category list of rally-inducing events is thought to be old-
fashioned by modern political scientists due to their heavy reliance on Cold War
events (Hetherington & Nelson, 2003).
By extending the historical time-frame and embracing the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and
Reagan administrations, Richard Brody (1991) found that events in the latter two
of Mueller’s five categories namely, major military developments in ongoing wars
and U.S.-Soviet summits were as likely to be causing drops in presidential approval
as resulting in boosts (Hetherington & Nelson, 2003).
Although most of the previous literature on the ’rally round the flag’ effect has been
focusing on the U.S. administration as their case-study, Wood (2008) investigates
the ’rally round the flag’ effect alongside democracy and human-rights’ conditions
in countries which have been facing U.S. or UN sanctions, arguing that economic
sanctions impose political, social, and physical difficulty on civilians by pushing
incumbents toward imposing further repression. However, it still does not offer
empirical support at the sub-national level. The recent US-Iran conflicts have drawn
lots of attention to the potential of a sub-national empirical case-study on Iran’s
political atmosphere.
The vast number of Iranian people coming to streets as a protest to US assassination
of general Qassem Soleimani and their surprisingly massive amount of participation
in his funeral, which took place just a few months after the oil-price protests, demon-
strates Iran as a good case-study around the topic of ’Rally Round the Flag’. In this
research, we apply quantitative methods on Twitter to explore the rally round the
flag in Iran’s case for seven Iranian foreign conflict cases prior to the assassination of
Qassem Soleimani. Unfortunately, due to the early time-frame of our research, the
specific case of Qassem Soleimani is not included in our analysis and left for future
works.
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2.2 Methods of Inferring Social-Media Users’ Ideology
In this study, we will review the previous literature on methods of ideology measure-
ment and try to explain the factors which encouraged us to choose a content-based
approach for our task:
In order to measure variations of sentiment toward state among twitter users across
the time, we initially need to come up with an assessment method of a tweep’s ide-
ology using social media. The literature on methods of inferring social-media users’
attributes based on their network positions is limited, though prosperous (Barberá,
Jost, Nagler, Tucker & Bonneau, 2015). According to Barberá et al. (2015) although
it is said that one’s ideology could be an estimator of his/her social and political
behavior (Jost, 2006), very limited work has been done to measure ideology by uti-
lization of social-media data (e.g. Back, Stopfer, Vazire, Gaddis, Schmukle, Egloff
& Gosling, 2010; Conover, Ratkiewicz, Francisco, Gonçalves, Menczer & Flammini,
2011; Kosinski, Stillwell & Graepel, 2013).
For instance, Weber, Garimella & Batayneh (2013) is an analysis run on Egyptian
tweeps to study the phenomenon of secular vs. Islamist polarization in twitter
considers the following as key findings while measuring tweeps’ partisan group:
• Retweeting signifies endorsement. One way is to utilize the simple retweet
data to check whether the tweep belongs to an Islamist or secular partisan
group.
• Similar user sets. On average, the personal traits of tweeps in both parties
follow akin distribution; not only in terms of activity rate but also gender
distribution and demographics.
• Polarized hashtags can be identified. One could assign a polarity score
to hashtags with the aim of recognizing the politicized topics automatically.
• Tension over time. Following the polarization and “distance from the cen-
ter” in the set of all hashtags across time (i.e., how much a hashtag is solely
adopted by one political affiliation or conversely how diverse it is among the
affiliations) could provide us with an overall understanding of political con-
flict which could not be identified by simple measures of volume or per-user
polarity trends.
• Community structure in retweeter graph. It is possible to observe and
measure a tendency for people with similar affiliations to connect to each other
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in their retweet network (Weber et al., 2013).
Looking into individual tweeps’ network positions, could be useful for tasks who
focus mainly on density of interactions among various tweeps’ with different ideolo-
gies (e.g. Weber et al., 2013) or the ones who aim to approximately measure the
similarity of tweeps’ ideology or exposure of a certain group of certain tweeps to
some other tweeps’ ideas in a network (Larson, Nagler, Ronen & Tucker, 2019).
However, the deficiency of this method for our specific task is that it does not assess
the aspect of which two tweeps may have moved towards each other. Two users
might retweet from each other at some point but it looks problematic to identify
that in what sense they have found a common ground in their discourse which has
motivated them to retweet from one-another. For example, a pro-regime and an
anti-regime feminist might retweet a tweet about the "metoo" case from each other
which shouldn’t be interpreted as their agreement on supporting the state. Indeed,
in our task, the content of the tweet plays a much more crucial role.
Since we want to detect the Rally-Round-the-Flag sentiment in each tweep over
time, we need to know if that similarity of opinion means that both tweeps are
supporting the state, or is it another issue they have both agreed on. Thus, we had
to try a new approach that focuses on the content of tweets rather than network
positions of the tweeps.
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3. DATA-SET
In recent years, Twitter has become one of the main sources of political news and
interactions among citizens and political authorities. Thus, it could somewhat be
claimed that Iranian twitter data could reflect the variations in Iran’s political at-
mosphere (Hajizadegan, 2019). Accordingly, our dataset contains of two sections,
one of which embraces the set of influencer tweeps and the other one contains the
set of tweets generated by those tweeps. In this chapter we will cover the structure
of these two datasets.
3.1 Tweeps
We used a list of Iranian Twitter influencers gathered by Hajizadegan & Jalaeipour
(2018). In that study, the term ‘influencer’ was attributed to the tweeps who satisfied
the following criteria:
1. Iranian tweeps are of their main audiences
2. Possess more than 10000 followers
3. The number of their followers are above two times more than their followings
A dataset of 1765 Iranian twitter influencers was gathered at the end of the day. The
dataset also contained 33 columns representing different attributes of each tweep.
The ones we utilized for our tasks were as follows:
• Political Affiliation: The dataset had divided the tweeps into six categories
of political affiliation. In a rough descending sorting based on their support for
the state, they are tagged as Conservatives, Reformists, Transitionists, Non-
Politicals, Overthrowers (literal translation of the Persian word ‘barandaz’,
meaning that they intend to overthrow the regime) and Separatists. Figure
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3.1 shows how the political affiliations are distributed among the tweeps in
respect to their number of followers (Hajizadegan & Jalaeipour, 2018).
Figure 3.1 Proportion of Affiliations Among the Tweeps
• Organization/Individuals: There are both tweeps who are affiliated with an
organization (e.g. news channels, NGOs, etc.) and tweeps who are individuals
sharing their personal views. The proportions of each affiliation’s population
is depicted in 3.2. As you see, the more we move toward more popular pages,
the proportion of organizational pages increases (Hajizadegan & Jalaeipour,
2018):
Figure 3.2 Proportion of Twitter page types
• Number of Followers: Well. . . That’s what it was.
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We initially dropped separatists from our list due to their data-sparsity. We also
omitted organizational tweeps since we are interested in studying the public opinion
which is not supposed to be reflected in a tweet from a news channel or other
organizations. At the end of the day, we were left with 1091 tweeps.
3.2 Tweets
For this project we worked on a dataset of 3,477,585 tweets which consists of all
the tweets by the 1091 influencers from 08/20/2014 to 08/20/2019. The dataset is
assembled in a csv file format obtained by Dr. Babak RezaeeDaryakenari as part
of his project on Political Actors Social Media Accounts (PASMA). It consist of 48
columns which the more important ones for our task are briefly explained here:
• ’authorscreen_name’: The user ID of the tweep as a string
• ’tweetfull_text’: Tweet’s full text as a string
• ’tweetcreated_at’: Tweet’s date and time of creation as a string in format
of “yyyy-mm-dd hh:mm:ss”.
• ’tweetin_reply_to_screen_name’: A string showing the tweep ID of the
person the tweet has been replied to. NaN if the tweet is not a reply.
• ’tweetlang’: The language of the tweet in a two-character-string format (e.g.
‘fa’ for Farsi, ‘en’ for English)
• ’tweetretweet_count’: The total number of retweets (integer)
• ’tweetfavorite_count’: The total number of likes (integer)
• ‘retweet_status’: A boolean value which is ‘True’ if the tweet is a retweet
and ‘False’ if the tweet is an original one.
• ‘retweeted_statusauthorscreen_nam’: A string showing the tweep ID
of the person the tweet has been retweeted from. NaN if the tweet is not a
retweet (i.e. as if ‘Retweet_status’=False)
• ‘hashtags’: A string containing all the hashtags in the tweet within; separated
by comma.
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3.3 Text Preprocessing
We initially removed the data of pre-Trump’s presidency (2016-11-08 00:00:00) to
focus further on one of the most tense eras of the U.S.-Iran relationships. This has
left us with 3,021,129 tweets. We also dropped the reply-tweets from our dataset
being left with 1,972,404 tweets at the end of the day. Furthermore, as a prior step
to our sentiment analysis, we defined a function which omitted all the punctuation-
marks, numbers, carriage-returns and newline commands and links from our tweets’
texts and converted all capital letters to lower-case letters and half-spaces to full-
spaces. This type of generalization might have caused losing a very minimal set of
information but contributed to our efforts in handling the data-sparsity problem.
3.4 Stratified Sampling on the Events
In the beginning, we took a random sample from all the tweets in the dataset for
the labelling step. However, we faced the problem of extreme sparsity of +1 class
tweets. It seems quite normal that in regular conditions, people are very unlikely to
make a positive comment about their government.
To tackle this problem, we stratified our data by separating the three days around
every seven foreign conflicts in our analysis. Then we selected a random sample
in each stratification based on the table 3.1. This increased the proportion of +1
class to a more appropriate state. Later, it was followed by the upsampling method
explained in the Methodology section and saved the day for our imbalanced data
classification.
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Events from till SampleSize
Trump’s pulling out of
the JCPOA 5/8/2018 0:00 5/11/2018 0:00 800
The White House
designation of
IRGC as an FTO
4/8/2019 0:00 4/11/2019 0:00 800
Trump tweeting about
the end of Iran 5/19/2019 0:00 5/22/2019 0:00 800
Iranian shoot-down
of American drone 6/20/2019 0:00 6/23/2019 0:00 800
UK’s seizure of
the Iranian-flagged
ship in Gibraltar
7/4/2019 0:00 7/7/2019 0:00 800
UK’s seizure of
Stena Impero by Iran 7/19/2019 0:00 7/22/2019 0:00 800
US imposure of
sanctions on Zarif 7/31/2019 0:00 8/3/2019 0:00 800
General Sample 1000
Table 3.1 Stratified-Sampling’s scheme
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4. METHODOLOGY
In this chapter we will take a general look into our task of sentiment analysis and
the tools and libraries we have used for this purpose next to the challenges we faced.
At the end we will report on our accuracy for our different classification techniques
in our two different approaches.
4.1 Sentiment Analysis
In order to prepare our dataset of tweets for a supervised-learning sentiment-analysis,
we manually labelled around 7000 tweets in our dataset as -1, 0, +1 which corre-
sponds to negative, neutral and positive sentiment toward the state. Then we trained
Classical Natural Language Processing algorithms on our labeled section of data,
and predicted the sentiment of all 2 million unlabeled tweets in our dataset. Con-
sequently, we followed the path elaborated in the following subsection to fulfill our
classification task.
4.1.1 Hazm Library
Hazm is a Python library for digesting Persian text. It is compatible with NLTK
library and similarly could perform the following tasks on Persian texts (Sobhe,
2018):
• Text-Cleaning
• Text-Normalizing
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• Sentence and Word Tokenizing
• Word-Stemming
• Word-Lemmatizing
• POS-Tagging
• Shallow-Parsing
• Dependency-Parsing
• Interfaces for Persian Corpora
Since we are looking into a dataset of tweets consisting of both Persian and English
texts, we utilized the Hazm library as an alternative/complement of NLTK in Python
by taking advantage of its word-lemmatizing and word-tokenizing ability.
However, one of the main issues with the current libraries for Persian texts is their
lack of support for the informal language and different writing habits. For instance,
in the following picture, Hazm is doing a fine job in lemmatizing the following word
which is a formal and correct way of writing ‘I am going’:
However, it is quite prevalent for tweeps on twitter to use informal Persian while
writing. As you could see in the following picture, Hazm is unable to lemmatize the
following word which is simply the informal version of the previous word.
Moreover, some people do not use half-space in unofficial texts for comfort. They
either ignore the half-space or replace it with a full-space. As you see, still Hazm is
unable to support their lemmatization:
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Existence of these types of inconsistencies in writing which are the case for the
majority of Persian verbs, and the inability of online tools such as Hazm in detecting
them would cause undesirable sparsity in our Bag-of-Words matrix and consequently
a less informative TF-IDF matrix. Future developments of such online tools like the
Hazm library could cause a significant boost in Natural Language Processing tasks
on Persian texts.
4.1.2 TF-IDF
Initially, after removing Persian and English Stop-Words, we extracted the text’s
TF-IDF features. TF-IDF is a common technique in the fields of information re-
trieval and text mining to evaluate the relationship for each word in the collection
of documents.
The TF part in TF-IDF stands for term-frequency which refers to the occurrence of
specific words in documents. Apparently, the more frequent a term in a document
the more important it could be. On the other hand, the DF stands for document-
frequency which implies the number of times a specific word appears in the collection
of documents. Terms which have higher DF value are less likely to be important
since they commonly appear in all documents (e.g. stop-words and common verbs
like: did, to, be, etc.). Thus, IDF that is an inverse of DF, measures the importance
of words in all documents. High IDF posits that the word is rare in all documents,
therefore we might want to pay more attention to it (Kim & Gil, 2019).
For a term t in a document d, the weight Wtd of term t in document d is given by
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(Góralewicz, 2018):
Wtd = TFtd× log( N
DFt
) (4.1)
4.1.3 Classification
The labelled data was split into 80% train-set and 20% test-set. A 5fold cross-
validation was run on the train-set to tune the best regularization-parameters for
the classifiers based on the highest F1-Score (weighted). Among classical machine-
learning algorithms, Logistic-Regression outperformed the rest and was chosen as
our main classifier (see table 4.1).
We also tried another approach which we named Affiliation-Based-Approach; mean-
ing that we classified tweets from each political affiliation separately rather than
classifying them all at once. This approach made a slight improvement in our F-
Score for tweets of Conservatives and Overthrowers(the radical anti-regime group).
This could be somewhat intuitive considering that radical pro and anti-regime groups
usually have a more distinct discourse and choice of words than other affiliations.
Therefore, classifying them separately would make the classification easier for a
classifier which is solely based on Bag-of-Words.
We finally classified Conservatives and Overthrowers based on the second approach
and the rest of the affiliations based one the first approach.
4.1.4 The Challenge of Simultaneous Oversampling & Cross-Validation
One of the most common ways of handling imbalanced datasets is oversampling. In
our dataset tweets labelled as +1 are pretty rare which is quite intuitive since people
are usually less likely to state a positive sentiment about their government in usual
cases.
In our initial confusion matrix for test-set, we were not able to detect any True-
Positive or even False-Positive +1 labels with our best classifiers. This pushed us
to try increasing the percentage of +1 labels firstly by stratified sampling from the
weeks which are potentially suspicious for a ’Rally Round the Flag’ case and sec-
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ondly by performing oversampling in our labelled train-data. This provided us with
reasonable accuracy for +1 class in a proportionate way to other classes’ accuracy.
However, the latter practice has a downside. When we do oversampling in our
train-set, a consequent cross-validation overestimates the test-set’s accuracy. The
clear reason is that oversampling creates repetition in a dataset on its discriminated
classes. Thus, when running a k-fold cross-validation, the classifier is already being
trained on a copy of some tweets in the k-1 training folds which makes it able to
easily predict the other copy of those tweets in the 1 remaining test fold. This will
make the cross-validation on the train-set unrepresentative of the test-set’s accuracy.
In order to tackle this problem, we needed to adjust our steps’ sequence as follows:
1. Splitting the train-set into k folds
2. Setting a regularization-parameter
3. Setting the first fold as the validation-set
4. Oversampling the data in the remaining k-1 training folds
5. Training the classifier on the oversampled k-1 folds with a regularization-
parameter
6. Calculating the F-Score of our classifier on the validation-set
7. Setting the next fold as the validation-set
8. Returning to step 4 (If we aren’t in the Kth fold)
9. Updating the regularization-parameter
10. Returning to step 3
For the coding part, we used utilized pipeline from imblearn library for this purpose
akin to (Martin, 2019).
4.1.5 Grid Search
Since we used a 5-fold cross-validation and checked 10 regularization-parameters
for each classifier, we did repeat oversampling and training every 50 times for each
classifier. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 depict the plots for our grid search in tuning the
regularization parameter for each classifier. For each plot, we have the classifier’s
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regularization parameter on the x-axis versus its corresponding F-Score(weighted)
on the y-axis.
For Logistic-Regression we tuned the parameter named C which is the inverse of
regularization parameter - A control variable that retains strength modification of
regularization by being inversely positioned to the Lambda regulator.
Given how Scikit cites it as being:
C = 1
λ
(4.2)
The relationship would be that lowering C - would strengthen the Lambda regulator
which is the penalty factor for the linear optimization of the classifier (Rusin, 2019).
Figure 4.1 Grid-Search for tuning the best regularization-parameter on Logit
The alpha parameter in Naive Bayes is the smoothing parameter which is there to
initially deal with the sparsity of data which causes zero parameters.
Figure 4.2 Grid-Search for tuning the best regularization-parameter on Naive-Bayes
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4.1.6 Accuracy on the Test-Set
For performance-assessment, we initially looked into the F-Score (weighted) provided
by each of the classifiers which convey the balance between the precision and the
recall. For our first classification-approach (i.e. classifying tweets of all affiliations
altogether) the accuracy measures of each classifier on the test-set are mentioned in
table 4.1 (i.e. all metrics are set as weighted):
Classifier
Accuracy Measure Precision Recall F1_Score
Logit (C=4) 0.725 0.724 0.723
Multinomial-Naive-Bayes (alpha=0.16) 0.696 0.631 0.644
Random-Forest-Classifier 0.717 0.727 0.707
Table 4.1 Accuracy-Measures of each classifier (1st Approach)
Our results show compatibility with some of the previous literature claiming advan-
tage for Logistic Regression over Naive Bayes Classifier when dealing with TF-IDF
data (Pranckevicius & Marcinkevičius, 2017).
Since we are dealing with an imbalanced multi-class dataset, we are supposed to
show the confusion matrices for a more realistic assessment of our classification
power. Table 4.2 shows our confusion-matrix for our best classic classifier which is
logistic regression with C=4. The rest of the confusion matrices could be found in
Appendix B.
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 223 108 41
0 79 628 58
+1 30 47 99
Table 4.2 Confusion-Matrix for Logistic Regression on the whole test-data (1st ap-
proach)
In order to be able to compare our first classification approach with the affiliation-
based one, we are also reporting its accuracy metrics and confusion matrices for each
affiliation separately. Table 4.3 shows the precision, recall, and f-score for different
affiliations in the test-set using the best-performed classifier of the first approach
which is Logistic Regression with C=4.
As mentioned earlier, we also tried a second approach which we named as the
’affiliation-based’ approach. Based on the intuition that people of the same affil-
iation have a more-or-less similar discourse and subsequently are more likely to use
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Political Affiliation
Accuracy Measure Precision Recall F1_Score
Conservatives 0.621 0.587 0.589
Reformists 0.644 0.642 0.638
Transitionists 0.714 0.703 0.707
Non-Politicals 0.904 0.874 0.887
Overthrowers 0.793 0.695 0.724
Unknown 0.856 0.844 0.843
Table 4.3 Accuracy of the 1st approach on each affiliation Separately
similar words, we grouped the tweeps by their political affiliation and tokenized their
tweets separate from other groups. Then, as in the first approach, we tuned the best
regularization parameter for the Logistic-Regression classifier on them and classified
them separately. This means that we trained 6 more Logistic-Regression classifiers.
Table 4.4 shows a report of the second approach’s accuracy on each affiliation in a
comparable manner with the first approach’s report in table 4.3.
Political Affiliation
Accuracy Measure C Precision Recall F1_Score
Conservatives 2 0.628 0.625 0.623
Reformists 0.4 0.620 0.607 0.611
Transitionists 0.64 0.644 0.645 0.644
Non-Politicals 0.20 0.849 0.871 0.859
Overthrowers 5 0.728 0.735 0.730
Unknown 1 0.664 0.697 0.667
Table 4.4 Accuracy of the 2nd approach on each affiliation separately
The rows highlighted as green in the 2nd approach are the ones who seem to outper-
form the 1st approach in terms of their F-Score. This outperformance holds for the
Conservatives and the Overthrowers which are both known as the radical pro-regime
and anti-regime camps. This is kind of an intuitive phenomenon since the more rad-
ical the political affiliation, the more unique their discourse might be; which makes
it a better idea to classify them separately as done in the 2nd approach. Thus, we
classified the Reformists, Transitionists, Non-Politicals, and Unknown ones by the
first, and the Conservative and Overthrowers by the second approach.
At last, the F1-Score for every affiliation on the test-set was higher than 60% and the
overall F1-Measure was higher than 70%. This accuracy was obtained on a super-
messy dataset consisting of both Persian and English texts with plenty of misspelled
words without space in Persian tweets. Next to that, the prevalence of both formal
and informal Persian in the tweets and the lack of an appropriate library for catching
those variations, made our sentiment-analysis task even more challenging.
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After labeling all the tweets in the dataset as -1, 0, and +1, in each week of our
analysis, we took the average of each tweep’s sentiments in that week (i.e. a tweep
with three tweets of +1 sentiment and one tweet of -1 sentiment was calculated as
+0.5 in that specific week). We kept track of the average of tweeps’ sentiments and
tried to observe their changes in our interested consecutive weeks.
4.2 Hypothesis
What we are anticipating to observe in the times of foreign interventions is a signif-
icant increase is the average of tweets’ sentiments.
Let si,t denote the sentiment of a tweet from tweep i in time t and ni,w denote the
total number of tweets from tweep i in week w. Thus we could calculate Si,w which
is mean sentiment of tweep i in week w:
Si,w = (
∑
t∈w
si,t)/ni,w (4.3)
∆Si,w = Si,w−Si,w−1 (4.4)
Hypothesis 1. In the weeks of foreign interventions the mean of the distribution of
the parameter ∆Si,w, which denotes the changes made in tweep i’s average sentiment
in week w in comparison to week w−1, shall be greater than zero in a statistically
significant manner for either all the tweeps or some political affiliations.
H′ : ∆Si,w > 0 (4.5)
The regression-analysis results in the conclusion section illustrate that for which
tweep’s political affiliation and in what sort of events our hypothesis holds.
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5. RESULTS
In this chapter, we will initially visualize our results of tweeps’ sentiment toward
the state and their possible shifts in cases of foreign intervention by some bubble
charts. Then we measure the significance of the shifts in each event and our null-
hypothesis by running a regression-analysis on the shifts of each affiliation in each
foreign conflict event. Furthermore, we also try running an analysis of "likes" and
investigate its possible implications for our research question.
5.1 Bubble-Charts
Before testing the statistical significance of our hypothesis, we came up with a
visualizing idea of portraying the variations of our tweeps’ sentiment towards the
state.
We proposed a bubble chart for each week of our analysis, having the average of
each tweep’s sentiment towards the state in the x-axis, the total likes he/she have
received on the y-axis, the total number of tweets as the size of the bubbles and the
political affiliation on the colors.
Visually speaking, at the first glance, this chart could provide the audience with
several implications regarding the ’rally round the flag’-status in the corresponding
week while comparing it with its previous week’s bubble-chart:
• If a specific color (affiliation) generally shifts to the right side - in comparison
to its previous week’s position - this week is a likely case of ’rally round the
flag’ for that political affiliation (i.e. that political affiliation is supporting the
state on the issues happening this week).
• If a specific color generally mounts higher in the plot, we could imply a more
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public favor towards the corresponding affiliation in that week which can give
us a notion of ’rally round the flag’ in the public tweeps rather than the mere
influencers ones. For instance, if conservatives gain more ’likes’ in a week, we
could deduct that their position was welcomed and strengthened in those turn
of events and probable sort of ’rally round the flag’ in public may be inferred.
• The more the chart is populated with bigger bubbles of a color, the more the
corresponding affiliation has been proactive in that week. This could be having
something to do with their influencers feeling a more formidable position to
talk.
Thus, in general, we would expect that in a week prone to a ’rally round the flag’, we
see a general shift to the right side - especially from moderate affiliations, Reformists
and Transitionists, represented by blue and purple -, a higher altitude and size
for red bubbles (Conservatives), and a lower altitude and size for black bubbles
(Overthrowers).
The bubble-charts portrayed in figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9
depict some of the foreign-conflict weeks which had a closer behaviour to meeting
our expectation. You could find all the remaining charts in the appendix.
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Figure 5.1 The week before U.S. pulled out of the JCPOA
Figure 5.2 The week U.S. pulled out of the JCPOA (we anticipate the rally here)
Figure 5.3 The week after U.S. pulled Out of the JCPOA
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Figure 5.4 The week before Iranian seizure of the British oil-tanker
Figure 5.5 The week of Iranian seizure of the British oil-tanker
Figure 5.6 The week after Iranian seizure of the British oil-tanker
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Figure 5.7 The week before Iranian shoot-down of the U.S. drone
Figure 5.8 The week of Iranian shoot-down of the U.S. drone
Figure 5.9 The week after Iranian shoot-down of the U.S. drone
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5.1.1 Aggregated Bubble-Charts
To tackle the problem of the messiness of the bubble-charts and get a more collective
view of the affiliations’ behaviour rather than individual tweeps, we also imposed
the aggregated version of bubble-charts as an extension to the regular ones.
In this set of charts, each affiliation is represented just by one collective dot/bubble.
Thus, the x-axis value of each bubble shows the average sentiment of all tweets gen-
erated by all the tweeps from the corresponding affiliation of the bubble. Similarly,
the y-axis, shows the average number of ’likes’ that all tweets from that affiliation
have won, and finally, the size of the bubbles represents the total number of tweets
from that affiliation. Colors represent political affiliation just as before.
Figures 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 show one case of our aggregated bubble-charts as a
sample. The rest could be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 5.10 The week before U.S. pulled out of the JCPOA
Figure 5.11 The week U.S. pulled out of the JCPOA (we anticipate the rally here)
Figure 5.12 The week after U.S. pulled out of the JCPOA
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A simple comparison between figure 5.10 and figure 5.11 shows that the Conserva-
tives plus all moderate oppositions have rallied around the flag. However, we see
a slight decrease in the altitude (average likes) of the Reformist camp positing a
possible falter in their popular support. The intuition could be that the Nuclear
Deal between Iran and 5+1 countries was signed by the Reformist government of
President Hasan Rouhani. Rationally, the one-sided violation of the deal by the
U.S. would be regarded as a sign of incompetency in the Reformist administration
and discourse.
5.2 Average of Likes
The Bubble-Charts mainly focus on the political behaviour of the Influencers in
cases of foreign interventions. Further than that, we are interested in investigating
the public behaviour in twitter in such cases.
The ’likes’, or formerly called ’favs’, are one of the key elements for quantifying the
public endorsement for a concept on Twitter, or more broadly, on the Social Media.
Looking at the total ’likes’ of each affiliation may give us some intuition about the
support for their position at a specific time. However, the total ’likes’ is correlated
with the number of tweets generated by Influencers which is a parameter solely
related to influencers’ behaviour. Since we are interested in looking at the political
support of camp while controlling the attitude of the Influencers, we consider the
average of ’likes’ as our measurement for popular support.
Figures 5.13, 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18 and 5.19 depict the variations of average of
’likes’ for different political camps in day around foreign conflicts. Our hypothesis is
that we are likely to see an increase in Conservatives’ mean of ’likes’ for most cases.
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Figure 5.13 Average of likes - U.S. pulling out of JCPOA
Figure 5.14 Average of likes - U.S. designation of IRGC as an FTO
Figure 5.15 Average of likes - Trump’s tweet about the ’End of Iran’
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Figure 5.16 Average of likes - Iranian shoot-down of American drone
Figure 5.17 Average of likes - UK’s seizure of Iranian-flagged ship in Gibraltar
Figure 5.18 Average of likes - Iranian’s seizure of the British oil-tanker
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Figure 5.19 Average of likes - U.S. imposure of sanction on Javad Zarif
5.3 Regression Analysis
The previous charts provide the reader with an initial glance of ’Rally Round the
Flag’ status in times of foreign-interventions. To statistically measure the signif-
icance of the changes according to our hypothesis mentioned in equation 4.5, we
ran a regression analysis on the tweeps’ sentiments as our descriptive measurement.
Considering the linear equation 5.1, we inserted the time (week) as our independent-
variable and the average of sentiment (S) for each tweep in week w as our dependent-
variable. Thus, the coefficient of the linear regression illustrates the average changes
in the tweeps’ sentiments as in equation 4.4.
Sw = aw+ b (5.1)
By looking at the coefficients’ confidence-intervals, we could quantify the significance
of the changes and examine our hypothesis on different events.
Figures 5.20, 5.21, 5.22, 5.23, 5.24, 5.25 and 5.26 show the 95% confidence-intervals
for changes in sentiment towards the state across all the seven events of our analysis.
The cases with a confidence-interval above zero are naturally considered as likely
cases of foreign-intervention.
31
Figure 5.20 Regression Analysis - U.S. pulling out of JCPOA
Figure 5.21 Regression Analysis - U.S. designation of IRGC as an FTO
Figure 5.22 Regression Analysis - Trump’s tweet about the ’End of Iran’
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Figure 5.23 Regression Analysis - Iranian shoot-down of American drone
Figure 5.24 Regression Analysis - UK’s seizure of Iranian-flagged ship in Gibraltar
Figure 5.25 Regression Analysis - Iranian’s seizure of the British oil-tanker
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Figure 5.26 Regression Analysis - U.S. imposure of sanction on Javad Zarif
Finally, our hypothesis-testing shows that the positive changes in the sentiment to-
wards the state in the events of ’JCPOA Violation’, ’U.S. Designation of IRGC as
an FTO, ’Iranian Shoot-Down of U.S. Drone’ and ’Iranian Seizure of the British
Oil-Tanker’ are statistically significant. Although in some events there is no signif-
icant change in average of the users, we could still detect positive changes among
some affiliations. In the conclusion section, we will look into the intuitions and
implications which could be derived from our results.
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6. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this study, we proposed a new content-based approach for quantifying the ’Rally
Round the Flag’ phenomenon in Iran by utilizing social media. Furthermore, by
comparison with public surveys, our analysis could also be used for investigating
how representative of public opinion the Twitter influencers might be. For now,
looking at the charts and regression-analysis we were able to infer the following
conclusions:
• Based on our regression-analysis, the positive changes in the sentiment towards
the state in the events of ’JCPOA Violation’, ’U.S. Designation of IRGC as an
FTO, ’Iranian Shoot-Down of U.S. Drone’ and ’Iranian Seizure of the British
Oil-Tanker’ are statistically significant. In other words, one could claim that
there is a 95% chance that in these three events, Iranian Influencers have
rallied around the flag.
• Looking at the influencers, both Conservatives and moderate opposition
groups (i.e. Reformists and Transitionists) are prone to ’Rally Round the
Flag’ effect in cases of foreign-interventions. However, the radical opposition
group (i.e. Overthrowers) is more likely to hold their former positions.
• Regarding the case of ’the U.S. Pulling out of JCPOA’, one intuition derived
from the strange wide range of confidence-interval (i.e. which is due to the
high variance of the values) for the Conservatives, could be that U.S. with-
drawal from the JCPOA might have caused more various positive and negative
sentiments among the Conservatives. Since the administration who signed the
JCPOA with P5+1 was a Reformist one, the Conservatives are more likely
to criticize the ’incompetency’ of the government’s diplomacy, next to their
probable support for the state. This could cause a higher variance and longer
confidence-interval.
• The comparison between the case of ’British Seizure of Iranian Oil-Tanker’ and
’Iranian Seizure of British Oil-Tanker’ shows that a case of military retaliation
by Iran is much more popular (esp. among Conservatives) than the foreign
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intervention cases which merely puts the Iranian government in the position of
the oppressed victim. The massive ’Rally Round the Flag’ effect for the case
of ’Iranian Shoot Down of the U.S. Drone’ further suggests this hypothesis
which is also compatible with a key finding of the IranPoll institution’s survey
positing that "more than two-thirds of Iranians think their country should
militarily respond if the United States, Saudi Arabia, or Israel were to attack
an Iranian nuclear facility" (Smeltz, 2020).
• According to a recent poll, "many Iranians seem to have lost interest in the
nuclear agreement reached between Iran and the P5+1 countries in 2015. Just
42 percent of Iranians approve of the nuclear agreement in the December 2019
poll, down from 76 percent approval in August 2015" (Smeltz, 2020). This
could open an argument that the recent cases of foreign conflicts, is radicaliz-
ing the public opinion in Iran’s political atmosphere strengthening either the
Conservatives or Overthrowers camp. This could be observed in the boost
for the average of likes in most cases of foreign-interventions for the Conser-
vatives; which somewhat shows a temporary increase in their popular favor
over moderates. However, this variation needs a future analysis of statistical
significance before jumping into a certain conclusion.
• In cases of "Trump’s Tweet" and "Sanction on Zarif", the reactions to internal
tensions (e.g. the hunger strike of a political prisoner) superseded the reactions
to a foreign conflict, generating more -1 class tweets and confusing both our
descriptive and predictive-analytics in detecting the ’Rally Round the Flag’
on Twitter.
• The comparison between the accuracy of our two classification-approaches,
suggests that for such text-mining tasks, it is sometimes a good idea to group
members of the same discourse and classify them separately rather than clas-
sifying all the discourses at once. This is most suggested for more polarized,
radicalized, and unique discourses that have certain keywords in their manner
of writing (i.e. in our task, Conservatives, and Overthrowers).
All of these findings are not only subject to a certain classification-error, but also
subject to a high generalization and simplification of the classes. There are certainly
much more complexities in the tweets in terms of sentiment towards the state than
a simple mapping into -1, 0, and +1. Moreover, the Iranian administration is a
complex of multiple governing actors. In some contexts, showing support for the
Supreme Leader could mean slamming the current Reformist government and vice
versa. However, all these cases are scaled while labelling.
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The future work could also contain a comparison of our content-based approaches
with a Twitter-Network-Analysis. This could be done either by looking into the
network of followers or the network of retweets among the tweeps. Moreover, the
content-based approach could be accompanied by an analysis of the hashtags next to
the texts. An improvement in Persian text-mining libraries (e.g. Hazm library which
we used) in the sense of enabling them to transform variations of Persian writing
to each-other (e.g. transforming Persian informal texts to formal, dealing with the
half-space variations in Persian texts) could offer a great boost to the classification
accuracy in a content-based task.
Furthermore, the new case of the assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani followed
by a massive rally in the streets and Iran’s retaliation, provides another perfect case-
study for the ’Rally Round the Flag’ phenomenon. Unfortunately, this was missed
in our dataset due to the early time-frame of our research. Future works could add
this as an extension to our literature as well.
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Appendices
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A. GRID-SEARCH PLOTS
We also tried tuning the regularization parameter for the logistic regression used
on our affiliation-based classification. Meaning that we separated the tweets of
each political affiliation’s tweeps and used a separate classifier for each of them.
The figures below show the tuning process for all of the political affiliations in our
analysis:
Figure A.1 Grid-Search for tuning the best regularization-parameter for Conserva-
tives
Figure A.2 Grid-Search for tuning the best regularization-parameter for Reformists
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Figure A.3 Grid-Search for tuning the best regularization-parameter for Transition-
ists
Figure A.4 Grid-Search for tuning the best regularization-parameter for Non-
Politicals
Figure A.5 Grid-Search for tuning the best regularization-parameter for Overthrow-
ers
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B. CONFUSION MATRICES
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 271 56 45
0 197 457 111
+1 50 25 101
Table B.1 Naive-Bayes Classifier on the whole test-set (1st approach)
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 191 161 20
0 45 702 18
+1 29 86 61
Table B.2 Random Forest Classifier on the whole test-set (1st approach)
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 9 6 2
0 7 22 2
+1 6 8 13
Table B.3 Logit on the Conservatives (1st approach)
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Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 42 32 7
0 26 126 12
+1 13 28 44
Table B.4 Logit on the reformists (1st approach)
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 61 22 4
0 23 109 17
+1 5 8 17
Table B.5 Logit on the Transitionists (1st approach)
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 5 9 1
0 14 239 9
+1 2 1 6
Table B.6 Logit on the Non-Politicals (1st approach)
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 5 1 3
0 1 37 3
+1 0 2 12
Table B.7 Logit on the Unclears (1st approach)
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 101 38 24
0 8 95 15
+1 4 0 7
Table B.8 Logit on the Overthrowers (1st approach)
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 8 9 1
0 2 14 7
+1 4 4 23
Table B.9 Logit(C=2) on the Conservatives (2nd approach)
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Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 42 16 13
0 37 111 27
+1 10 30 53
Table B.10 Logit(C=0.4) on the Reformists (2nd approach)
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 71 44 11
0 39 171 19
+1 14 17 20
Table B.11 Logit(C=0.64) on the Transitionists (2nd approach)
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 3 19 1
0 11 258 3
+1 0 5 3
Table B.12 Logit(C=0.2) on the Non-Politicals (2nd approach)
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 2 6 2
0 2 40 3
+1 0 7 4
Table B.13 Logit(C=1) on the Unclears (2nd approach)
Predicted
Sentiment -1 0 +1
A
ct
ua
l -1 119 30 2
0 32 74 0
+1 5 1 1
Table B.14 Logit(C=5) on the Overthrowers (2nd approach)
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C. BUBBLE CHARTS
Figure C.1 The Week Before U.S. designated JCPOA as an FTO
Figure C.2 The week U.S. designated JCPOA as an FTO
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Figure C.3 The week after U.S. designated IRGC as an FTO
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Figure C.4 The week before Trump’s tweet about ’the End of Iran’
Figure C.5 The week of Trump’s tweet about ’the End of Iran’
Figure C.6 The week after Trump’s tweet about ’the End of Iran’
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Figure C.7 The week before UK seizure of the Iranian oil-tanker
Figure C.8 The week of UK seizure of the Iranian oil-tanker
Figure C.9 The week after UK seizure of the Iranian oil-tanker
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Figure C.10 The week before U.S. imposure of sanctions on Javad Zarif
Figure C.11 The week of U.S. imposure of sanctions on Javad Zarif
Figure C.12 The week after U.S. imposure of sanctions on Javad Zarif
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D. AGGREGATED BUBBLE CHARTS
Figure D.1 The Week Before U.S. Pulled Out of the JCPOA
Figure D.2 The week U.S. pulled out of the JCPOA (we anticipate the rally here)
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Figure D.3 The week after U.S. pulled out of the JCPOA
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Figure D.4 The week before U.S. designated IRGC as an FTO
Figure D.5 The week U.S. designated IRGC as an FTO
Figure D.6 The week after U.S. designated IRGC as an FTO
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Figure D.7 The week before Trump’s tweet about ’the End of Iran’
Figure D.8 The week of Trump’s tweet about ’the End of Iran’
Figure D.9 The week after Trump’s tweet about ’the End of Iran’
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Figure D.10 The week before Iranian shoot-down of the U.S. drone
Figure D.11 The week of Iranian shoot-down of the U.S. drone
Figure D.12 The week after Iranian shoot-down of the U.S. drone
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Figure D.13 The week before UK seizure of the Iranian oil-tanker
Figure D.14 The week of UK seizure of the Iranian oil-tanker
Figure D.15 The week after UK seizure of the Iranian oil-tanker
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Figure D.16 The week before Iranian seizure of the British oil-tanker
Figure D.17 The week of Iranian seizure of the British oil-tanker
Figure D.18 The week after Iranian seizure of the British oil-tanker
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Figure D.19 The week before U.S. imposure of sanctions on Javad Zarif
Figure D.20 The week of U.S. imposure of sanctions on Javad Zarif
Figure D.21 The week after U.S. imposure of sanctions on Javad Zarif
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